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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UNITED STATES SMELTING, REFIN-
ING AND MINING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
- vs -
PAUL D. NIELSEN and the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
10703 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff seeks review of an order of the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah (herein after called 
Commission) awarding defendant temporary total 
compensation and permanent partial disability for 
physical injuries and loss of wages arising from an 
accident which occured on September 16, 1952. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Upon petition by the defendant for compensa-
tion benefits arising from an accident in 1952, the 
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Commission awarded benefits in 1954. Subsequent-
ly, in 1965, the defendant was compelled to under-
go surgery because of the 1952 injury and the Com-
mission awarded the defendant temporary total 
compensation and permanent partial disability 
compensation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
The defendant submits the award of the Com-
mission should be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following Statement 
of Facts: 
On September 16, 1952, at approximately 2:15 
p.m. the respondent, then age 29, and an employee 
of United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Com-
pany in Lark, Utah, was injured by a mine cave-in 
(R. 1). He received a fracture of 1he pelvis and left 
femur (R. 1). On January 30, 1954, the Medical Ad-
visory Board determined that the respondent's con-
dition had stabilized and found about a % inch 
shortening of the lower left leg with limited flexion 
of the knee joint. He was given a permanent partial 
disability rating of thirty percent (R. 19). He accepted 
a lump sum payment of $1,633.50. On March 17, 1965, 
respondent filed an application for additional bene-
fits with the Commission (R. 25). The claim was filed 
due to complications arising out of an operation re--
quired by his original injury in which the knee cap 
was removed (R. 28-29). Subsequent to the operation 
the respondent experienced atrophy of both hands 
(R. 31). A hearing was held before the Commission 
and the respondent testified that he sold his business 
which he had been operating as the result of his 
previous lump sum award (R. 35), and had an opera-
tion for the removal of his knee cap. Subsequent to 
the operation he noticed a loss of feeling in his arms 
and a general deterioration of the muscle (R. 44-46). 
The report of Dr. Chester B. Powell indicated that al-
though the nature of the respondent's impediment to 
his arms was unusual as a result of the operation of 
the knee cap it was not unknown and apparently 
could result from complications during surgery (R. 
56-60). Dr. Powell testified at a hearing before the 
Commission that the respondent's problem appar:. 
ently resulted from lying on his back during the 
post-operative period with his arms in a slightly 
flexed manner which impaired the blood supply of 
the ulnar nerves (R. 84). The Commission on July 13, 
1966, entered an order granting the respondent tem-
porary total compensation in the amount of $1,011.21 
and permanent partial compensation in the amount 
of $725.00 as well as requiring reimbursement for 
medical expenses (R. 90-91 ). 
The sole contention of the appellant in this case 
was that the six year limitations period precluded 
respondent from seeking compensation for his sub-
sequent disability. The Commission in its order 
noted that they have long construed the limitations 
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period to mean casualty years, not calendar years, 
and over-ruled appellant's contention. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POINT I. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CON-
CLUDED THAT TEMPORARY COMPENSATION AND 
PERMANENT PARTIAL COMPENSATION IS LIMITED 
TO SIX CASUALTY YEARS FROM THE DATE OF IN-
JURY. 
The Appellant contends the Commission should 
have imposed a six year statute of limitations from 
the time of the defendant's original accident in 1952 
and denied payments of temporary total disability 
and permanent partial disability. The defendant sub-
mits the position of the Commission in rejecting the 
plaintiff's position is correct. 
The plaintiff contends that Utah Code Ann. §§ 
42-1-61, -62 (1943) are the applicable statutes govern-
ing this case. Whether the plaintiff's assertion that 
the statute in force at the time of the injury means 
the time of the original act giving rise to the claim, 
as distinct from the statute in force when the dis-
ability occurs is open to question. Plaintiff, before 
the Commission, did not contend for the application 
of the 1943 Code but referred to the 1953 codifica-
tion of Utah law (R. 50). Therefore, the plaintiff's argu-
ment on the question of which version of the statute 
is applicable here is of no concern since it was not 
properly raised below. Plaintiff contends that since 
the relevant portion of the 1943 Codeis the same a~ 
the 1953 version there is no real issue. However, the 
defendant (especially the Commission) is unwilling 
to concede the position even though it appears in-
nocuous to this case since, (1) the Legislature could 
well have intended the applicable statute referring 
to "injury" to mean not the accident giving rise to 
the ultimate injury, but the time of disability which 
is the "injury", and, (2) the Legislature could well in-
tend a new statute adopting old language to be op-
erative to the occurance of the need for compensa-
tion, depending on legislative intent, and finally, 
(3) the fact of re-enactment may· evidence an in ten-. 
tion of the Legislature to have words used in the 
statutes construed in harmony with a subsequent ad'-' 
ministrative interpretation thus characterizing the' 
original legislative intent. 
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954) in a 
dicta pronouncement merely noted the general rui~ 
as cited in 58 Am. Jur Work~en's CompensaUon § 
78 that with respect to the right to compensation the 
time runs from the date of injury. But even so this 
would not mean the claim herein involved would 
not be governed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65, -66 
(1953), since the injury occuring to defendant was 
the atrophy of his arms. Injury and accident are not 
necessarily synonymous. 
For several reasons the defendant contends th<~ 
Commission's position below sho~ld be sustained. 
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That is, that the six year period referred to in Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65, -66 (1953) or Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 42-1-61, -62, (1943) if deemed applicable, should 
apply to years of disability or casualty and not cal-
endar years (R. 90). 
In the first instance the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act is aimed at alleviating the hardships result-
ing from industrial accidents, and a construction cf 
any provision of the act should keep in mind the re-
medial purposes of the act. Thus, any construction 
given should support the social benevolence be-
hind the legislation if the context will allow it. Baker 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 
(1965); Askren v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 275 
391 P.2d 302 (1964); Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Indust-
rial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 (1943); 
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 
492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942); North Beck Mining Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 486, 200 Pac. 111 (1921). 
Accepting the above cannon of construction it is ap-
parent the Industrial Commission was correct and 
the six year period referred to in both compilations 
of the Utah Code should be construed to mean cas-
ualty years or years of disability, and not six years 
from the time of the accident. 
Second, it is submitted that since the Commis-
sion has for a long time construed the six year limi-
tation period to mean casualt yyears and the Legis-
lature has taken no action to correct or clarify this 
application of the statute, the long administrative 
interpretation can be taken as evidencing a com-
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parable legislative intent. The plaintiff acknowl-
edges that the pertinent language of the applicable 
statutes has been the same as it is now since 1939. 
Numerous sessions of the Legislature have been 
held and no action has been taken to change the 
Commission's practice of interpreting the six year 
period as was done here. In the instant case the 
Commissioner's order observed: "The Commission 
has always interpreted said sectio nto mean casualty 
years and not calendar years." (R. 90). 
The Legislature has amended both sections of 
law on numerous occasions, the last being at the 
last regular session in 1965. Utah Laws Ch. 68, § 1 
(1965). However, no effort to override the Commis-
sion's interpretation of the six year period was ever 
made. 
It is a well settled rule of statutory construction 
that the Legislature is presumed to know the admin-
istrative application being given statutes and the re-
enactment of a statute without change is deemed 
legislative approval of the administrative construc-
tion. State v. Hatch, 9 Utah 2d 288, 342 P.2d 1103 
(1959). Applying the rule to this case it seems in-
escapable that the six year period in the subject 
statutes must be construed to mean casualty years. 
A third reason for the Commission's construc-
tion also exists. Judicial interpretation by this Court 
supports the construction in favor of the six year 
period being construed as casualty years. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-65 (1953), has since its enactment referred 
to a period "six years from date of injury," the same 
as it now reads. In Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Indus· 
trial Comm'IL 116 Utah 305, 309, 209 P.2d 571, 574 
(1949), this Court construed the six year period lan-
guage contrary to the plaintiff's contention and did 
so referring to Hardy v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Utah 
561, 58 P.2d 15 (1936): 
We there held that the provision that payment of 
compensation should not continue for more than six 
years from the date of the injury was only meant to 
fix the period during which payment is to extend, 
that is, the disability period, and that it was not in 
conflict with 42-1-72, supra, which provides that the 
jurisdiction of the Commission shall be continuing. 
Thus there is a judicial construction of a section 
under consideration in this case which is directly 
contrary to plaintiffs contentions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-66 (1953) has also been 
construed contrary to the position now urged by 
plaintiff. Hardy v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Utah 
561, 58 P.2d 15 (1936). As to this case the plaintiff con-
tends the 1939 amendment changed the statute. The 
statute as written when Hardy was decided merely 
provided the six year period would run from "the 
fourth day of disability". In 1939 this was changed 
to provide that it should run "from the date of in-
jury". Utah Laws ch. 51, § 1 (1939). It is submitted that 
this change merely did away with the four day dis· 
ability period and allowed the injured workman to 
recover from the inception of the disability. The 
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change can hardly be read as evidencing a legisla-
tive intent to change the construction from six cas-
ualty years to six calendar years. If the Legislature 
had so intended it could have expressly so stated. 
Further, the Utah Apex Mining case was decided 
after the amendment and referred to Hardy with ap. 
proval. The court apparently felt the statutes were to 
be construed in harmony, and there was nothing in-
appropriate in the construction of either statute as 
referring to casualty years. Plaintiff contends the 
Utah Apex Mining case failed to observe the change 
in the provisions of the statute which occured in 
1939. It is submitted the change was not of concern 
since it merely removed the four day waiting period 
and did not purport to otherwise change the con-
struction given the statute in the Hardy decision. 
In addition it is submitted the plaintiff's position 
assumes that the world injury in the statutes is equiv-
alent t oth eoccuring of the accident in 1951. It is sub-
mitted this is not a proper construction of the statute. 
Injury, it is submitted, means the time of the detri-
ment, hurt or loss, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 
Va. 409, 35 S.E. 594, (1948), and not necessarily the 
sudden, fortuitous event that is an accident. In this 
case, the injury occured when the defendants arms 
atrophied. This was in 1965 and the compensation .is 
well within the six year period even assuming the 
period relates to "time" rather than casualty. The 
courts have recognized in several cases that the term 
injury as it is used in Workmen's Compensation 
statutes may have a much broader application than 
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an accident. Many courts have recognized that acci-
dent and injury are not synonymous under Work-
men's Compensation Acts. In re soran Smith v. 
Mercy Hosp .. 60 Idaho 674, 95 P.2d 580 (1939);1n re 
Soran. 57 Idaho 483, 67 P.2d 906 (1937); Cooke v. Hol-
land Furnace Co. 200 Mich. 192, 166 N.W. 1013 (1918). 
The injury may result from the accident and it may 
occur at a time far removed from the time of acci-
dent. Donaldson v. Calvert-McBride Printing Co .. 
217 Ark. 625, 232 S.W. 2d 651 (1950); Flippin v. First 
Nat'! Bank. 372 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. App. 1963); lndemn· 
ity Ins. Co. of No. America v. Williams. 69 S.W.2d 
519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Jarrett v. Travelers' Ins. 
Co .• 66 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Sheafor v. 
Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 498, 166 N.W. 4 
(1918). Therefore, even assuming the construction 
of the relevant statutes should be in terms of calen-
dar rather than casualty years, the injury in this case 
did not occur at the time of the accident but rather 
later at the time of loss of function to defendant's 
arms, and the compensation period of six years has 
not run. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that plaintiff seeks a reconstruct-
ion of the relevant statutes contrary to accepted 
principles of statutory construction and contrary t0 
long accepted judicial precedent from this court. 
It is submitted that even if the plaintiff's con-
tention for a calendar year construction should be 
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accepted that its position on review must fail be-
cause of the erroneous assumption that accident and 
injury are synonymous. 
This Court should affirm the award of the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
